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This work discusses some of the critical aspects of bank corporate governance in the European
Union. Enhancing sound corporate governance practices has become one of the major con-
cerns in the supervisory authority's agenda and one of the critical features to evaluate banks'
stability. The global rethinking about corporate governance rules has translated into a
stronger focus on board diversity for EU banks. The existing literature and sound corporate
governance practices support the view that di®erent types of board members may bring
di®erent capabilities to their banks. Even if board diversity may add complexity to the
functioning of the board, the advantages it brings are of utmost importance in the challenging
environment banks are facing. This work highlights the fragmentation of the EU corporate
governance rules as banks have to comply with 27 sets of di®erent regulations and codes. This
complexity should not be ignored, as member states' speci¯cities, legal systems, and a more
general openness to diversity in°uence the e®ect reforms may have on banks' performance and
stability.
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1. Introduction
In recent years, corporate governance issues have received increasing attention from
various international bodies. As highlighted by the Group of Thirty (2012), weak-
nesses in bank corporate governance mechanisms are thought to have played a vital
role during the global ¯nancial crisis (GFC) in promoting bank risk-taking.
The ¯nding that corporate governance has implications for bank stability was
already established long before the GFC (see among others, Saunders et al. 1990,
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Gorton & Rosen 1995, Anderson & Fraser 2000). Sound corporate governance is
fundamental to the banking system to operate well.
The GFC brought attention, both in academic and policy circles, back to the
role of bank corporate governance structures for ¯nancial stability. Recent litera-
ture investigates the impact of corporate governance on bank risk-taking (Caprio
et al. 2007, Laeven & Levine 2009, Pathan 2009, DeYoung et al. 2013). Kirkpatrick
(2009) establishes that weak corporate governance in banks leads to inadequate
risk management, especially insu±cient risk monitoring through the board, a factor
that contributed signi¯cantly to the bank instabilities during the crisis. Berger
et al. (2016) show that corporate governance arrangements lead to actual bank
failure. Recent academic work was aimed at identifying the most e±cient bank
governance structures (Adams & Mehran 2012, Beltratti & Stulz 2012, Mehran
et al. 2011).
Policymakers have tried to address the perceived °aws of the existing bank
governance structures with a series of initiatives to control bank risk-taking (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2014, Federal Reserve 2010, Liikanen Report
2012). Policymakers and regulators have mainly focused on speci¯c governance
shortcomings (Srivastav & Hagendor® 2016). In the UK, the Walker Review
(Walker 2009) revises board arrangements and the quali¯cations of board members
as well as the compensation arrangements. Similarly, since 2010, the Dutch Banking
Code has been addressing the selection process of bank boards, including the skill and
training of board members and their remuneration. Guidance for compensation
has been released, introducing restrictions on salary and perks, and disclosure of
compensation (Federal Reserve 2010).
In the European Union (EU), initiatives by policymakers included an emphasis
on increased diversity. CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU) reinforces the governance
requirements for banks, highlighting the responsibility of the management body for
sound governance arrangements, the importance of a robust board that challenges
and monitors management decision-making, and the need to establish and imple-
ment a sound risk strategy and risk management framework. Among the enhanced
corporate governance rules, CRD IV requirements promote diversity in board
composition to counteract the phenomenon of groupthink. This phenomenon is
partly responsible for the lack of monitoring by the board of directors of management
decisions. To facilitate independent opinions and critical challenges, CRD IV
recommends that the board of directors encompass su±ciently diverse age, gender,
geographical provenance and educational and professional background to provide a
variety of views, soft skills and experiences.
This note discusses the main features of bank corporate governance in the EU
and its implications for ¯nancial stability. Section 2 reviews the recent changes in
EU regulation and the challenges posed to the banking system. Section 3 focuses
on board diversity and its impact on banks' stability. Section 4 concludes this
paper.
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2. Changes and Challenges in the EU Regulation on Bank
Corporate Governance
Sound governance is relevant in any organization and it is even more critical in a
complex and challenging environment as the one banks are facing nowadays. Sound
governance provides the necessary checks and balances; it counters excessive risk-
taking; it ensures that decisions are taken sustainably.
Since the beginning of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), ECB Banking
Supervision has developed a comprehensive approach based on a range of tools to
assess the design and implementation of sound governance in the European banking
system (ECB 2018). A ¯rst tool is a ¯t and proper assessment which is employed to
check whether banks' board members are suited to their position. The Supervisory
Authority assesses their experience, reputation, independence, their time commit-
ment and their potential con°icts of interest to ensure that they are ¯t and proper for
the job. Secondly, governance is one of the four central elements that constitute the
Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). SREP allows the ECB, and
the national supervisory authorities for the less signi¯cant banks, to analyze whether
the risks that a bank takes are consistent with its risk capacity and strategic
objectives by assessing banks' risk appetite framework (RAF). In particular, banks
should mull the policies, processes, controls, systems, and procedures de¯ned in their
RAF over their decision-making processes and risk management. The RAF should
also be aligned with banks' business plans, strategies, capital planning, and remu-
neration schemes. A third tool is the \deep-dive" one, that is an on-site mission,
which allows the ECB to better understand speci¯c processes or approaches related
to governance and risk assessment, for instance by attending board meetings. On-site
inspections are a fourth tool which is used to discuss governance and risk manage-
ment with banks. The ECB also uses benchmarking, for example, through thematic
reviews. A thematic review on governance and risk appetite addressed the topic from
various angles, such as risk culture, the composition, and organization of the board of
directors and decision-making (ECB, 2016). The ¯ndings of the supervisory tools can
be used to ¯ne-tune the SREP methodology.
According to ECB (2018), despite signi¯cant achievements, banks still need to
make improvements on (i) the ¯t and proper assessments, (ii) boards' independence,
(iii) risk appetite frameworks, and (iv) risk reporting and data aggregation. As for
the ¯rst aspect, the collective knowledge of the board can be improved, strengthening
some areas of expertize, such as IT and accounting. In this respect, induction
arrangements and ongoing training are not always su±cient to ensure risk awareness
and thus foster the necessary quality of debate (ECB 2016). The quality of debate on
the board, especially its capacity to independently challenge the executives, is a key
element to enhance board independence. The quality of debate can be improved
working on the quality of documentation, on interactions among board members and
the organizations of board meetings. The ECB (2016) highlights various short-
comings, for example, that the documentation is often not sent su±ciently far in
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advance, information asymmetries among board members can reduce the quality of
the debate and the time of debate is often too limited. On the design of the RAF,
several banks, in particular the smaller ones, have only recently formalized and
integrated the framework. Thus areas of improvements are related to the full cov-
erage of material risk areas, in particular non¯nancial risks or pro¯tability and
business risk, and to the proper adjustment of the risk appetite metrics to the bank's
business model and risk pro¯le. Finally, it is essential that banks have e®ective
management information systems to be able to report any limit breach adequately
and promptly. Data aggregation issues impact the quality of the risk reports and
hamper an e®ective reporting of limit breaches.
A second challenge European banks face refers to the governance rules applicable
in Europe. Although various policy initiatives at the EU level aimed at improving
standards of corporate governance, further harmonization and supervisory conver-
gence are needed to ensuring a level playing ¯eld. Rules are di®erent among member
states; as a consequence, banks have to apply national law in this area facing higher
compliance costs and greater complexity. Besides, the grip of nationalism on cor-
porate law shows how governance structures matter in ways that surpass the agency
cost considerations investigated in the literature (Pargendler 2019). Pressures
in°uencing governance policies re°ect di®ering views of capital markets and
corporate purpose between shareholder and stakeholder-oriented systems. In the
Netherlands, comply-or-explain code works reasonably well, assisted by the existence
of a monitoring capability in this jurisdiction (Dallas & Pitt-Watson 2016).
Nevertheless, in situations involving controlling shareholders, the lack of an en-
forcement mechanism may be a weakness of comply-or-explain. Minimum corporate
governance standards or stricter enforcement laws at the European level might help
overcome such de¯ciencies. However, a potential risk of attempts for further
harmonization is to lower base standards to establish an acceptable common
denominator across a very diverse group of countries with di®ering governance
traditions.
3. The Role of Diversity in Bank Corporate Governance
Many of the post-crisis governance reforms explicitly emphasize the importance of
diversity in the boardroom. Most of these initiatives are based on the view that more
diverse boards, with an increased presence of women and minorities, would positively
a®ect the governance of companies. One argument is that gender balance is of par-
ticular importance to ensure adequate representation of population and directors
should be selected among a greater pool of talents. Employee representation in the
boardroom could also, by adding a di®erent perspective and knowledge of the
internal workings of companies, be seen as a positive way of enhancing diversity.
More diverse boards should more e®ectively monitor management and therefore
contribute to improved risk oversight and resilience of banks. They can also help
improve decision-making regarding strategies and risk-taking by facilitating a
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broader range of views, opinions, experience, perception, values and backgrounds.
Directive 2013/36/EU recommends that diversity is one of the criteria for the
composition of boards and should also be addressed in banks' recruitment policy
more generally.
Despite a general call for greater diversity, EBA (2016) shows that in most
member states, a relatively low number of banks have adopted a diversity policy.
Most frequently, banks do not indicate a timeline within which they intend to
achieve diversity targets. Evidence suggests that soft law regulation aimed at im-
proving the participation of women and minorities in high pro¯le roles have had little
impact. Therefore, several European regulators recommend gender quotas for pub-
licly listed companies' boards. In this respect, a widely studied case outside the EU is
the Norwegian one. In 2003, the Norwegian Parliament passed a soft law requiring all
public limited companies to have at least 40% of women on their boards of directors.
After voluntary compliance failed, the requirement became law in 2006, with a two-
year transition period and liquidation as a penalty for noncompliance. Following
Norway's example, some European countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain and Germany, have since promoted legislation aiming to increase
gender diversity on corporate boards via the imposition of quotas. The EU Com-
mission has discussed a gender quota of 40% for all large EU companies following the
Norwegian experience. The e®ect of reforms on bank performance is however com-
plex to disentangle. Arnaboldi et al. (2018b) document that reforms increase bank
stock returns up to two years after their introduction. While the impact is similar
across mandatory regulation and soft law, the e®ectiveness of reforms depends on a
country's institutional environment, its legal origin and its cultural openness to
diversity.
The \one size does not ¯t all" ¯nding may help explain the mixed empirical
evidence on diversity. The literature has documented that board characteristics are
not exogenous random variables but are endogenously chosen by ¯rms (Hermalin &
Weisbach 2003, Adams & Ferreira 2012, Sila et al. 2016). With some exceptions,
most studies on the impact of board features on ¯rm performance have
excluded ¯nancial ¯rms from their analysis due to their regulated nature. Further,
literature has mainly investigated the US (see, among others, Adams & Funk 2012,
Hagendor® & Keasey 2012, Sila et al. 2016) or a single country (for example, Berger
et al. 2014, Huyghebaert & Wang 2017).
Recently, de Cabo et al. (2012), Garcia-Meca et al. (2015), Farag & Mallin
(2017) have studied the impact of board diversity features on European banks'
performance. The nationality of directors is one of the main characteristics of board
diversity. The increasing internationalization of business leads to higher demand for
directors who possess the necessary knowledge and contacts in foreign markets to
link the bank to the di®erent contexts of the countries in which it operates
(Carpenter et al. 2001). The literature suggests that foreign directors go beyond
¯nancial contributions and extend to the provision of managerial expertize and
Corporate Governance in the European Banking Sector
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technical collaborations increasing creativity and innovation (Ezat & El-Masry
2008, Samaha et al. 2012).
The increasing pressure for gender diversity may be one of the factors explaining
the growing number of women in the boardroom (Farrell & Hersch 2005, Dunn
2012). However, very often banks show a tokenism behavior: once the target is met
with one woman on the board, there are no further hires of women to the board,
because \token" board member is seen as representing the \minority" in general
(Kanter 1977). Literature provides evidence supporting the existence of tokenism.
On a sample of Chinese ¯rms, Liu et al. (2014) show that ¯rm performance is
positively related to gender diversity, but there must be a critical mass of at least
three women to obtain a positive e®ect. Besides, the economic, legal and cultural
environment banks that operate may a®ect the diversity–performance relationship.
Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) ¯nd evidence that gender diversity improves ¯nancial
performance, especially in those banks located in countries with high investor pro-
tection and strong bank regulation. Based on this evidence, the authors support
public policy initiatives for quotas of women on corporate boards.
EBA (2016) considers gender diversity a key aspect of diversity, as di®erent
attitudes and behaviors can be observed in persons of di®erent gender. The same
holds for age, as the period in which a person has grown up in°uences his or her
values, skills, experiences, social networks, and risk culture. By increasing the age
diversity of the board of directors, the board's aggregated human and social capital
can be maximized with a positive impact on performance (Carter et al. 2010). On the
other hand, Westphal & Zajac (1995) argue that CEOs prefer to work with demo-
graphically similar board directors. Thus, CEOs who can in°uence the directors'
nomination process will try to hire directors who are demographically similar to
themselves. Furthermore, member states show di®erent demographical structures,
which may a®ect the age of board members. To this extent, the supervisory authority
encourages to selecting board members of di®erent age to enhance board diversity.
Geographical provenance of directors should also be taken into consideration
(EBA 2016). Directors coming from international backgrounds may understand the
cultural values, market speci¯cities and legal frameworks present in the central
business hubs the banks are active in, and facilitate informed decision-making re-
garding the business strategy within those foreign countries and areas. While sub-
stantial board internationalization increase complexity and may hurt bank
performance, the presence of foreign directors appears to be less detrimental during
a ¯nancial crisis and in countries that are more welcoming towards diversity
(Arnaboldi et al. 2018a).
An additional diversity feature relates to education and previous experiences of
the directors. Education and professional background of board members have an
in°uence on their perceptions and hence their decisions stand with direct impli-
cations for corporate risk-taking and the decision-making process (Hambrick 2007,
Li & Tang 2010, Sanders & Hambrick 2007). Farag & Mallin (2018) ¯nd a
positive and signi¯cant relationship between both CEO higher education and their
F. Arnaboldi
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previous board experience and corporate risk-taking. CEOs' professional back-
ground has a positive impact on private companies' innovation in China (Lin et al.
2011). Terjesen et al. (2009) using the human capital theory of Becker (1964) argue
that an individual's education, skills, and experience frame their cognition and
productivity. Board members with law backgrounds may have a better perception
of legal aspects and regulations as opposed to members with accounting back-
grounds who might be more knowledgeable about ¯nancial issues. Di®erent human
capital may bring di®erent experiences to the board enriching the overall company
(Hillman et al. 2000).
4. Conclusion
This paper discusses some of the critical aspects of bank corporate governance in the
EU. Three main conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, the relevance of the
board of directors has increased since the establishment of the Banking Union. The
board of directors is responsible for banks' major strategic decisions and for ensuring
that its franchise value can survive outside shocks. The ability of the board to perform
the monitoring, advisory and resource provisioning functions depends crucially on the
complexity of the operational structure of the bank and the conditions of the external
environment. The GFC highlighted the °aws in the functioning of the board of
directors which re°ected in banks' excessive risk-taking. Enhancing sound corporate
governance practices has become one of the major concerns in the supervisory
authority's agenda and one of the key features to evaluate banks' stability.
Second, the global rethinking about corporate governance rules has translated
into a stronger focus on board diversity for EU banks. Literature and sound cor-
porate governance practices support the view that di®erent types of board members
may bring di®erent resources to their banks. Hence more diverse boards are likely to
bring di®erent sets of intangible resources to their banks. Even if board diversity may
add complexity to the functioning of the board, the assets it brings are of utmost
importance in the challenging environment banks are facing. Banks should see board
diversity as an opportunity to gather skills and experiences, which can bene¯t all
stakeholders.
Third, regulatory authority faces challenges to ensure the level playing ¯eld. In
the EU corporate governance rules are still fragmented, and banks have to comply
with 27 sets of di®erent regulations and codes. Regulators should, however, consider
that one size does not ¯t all and member states' speci¯cities, legal systems, and a
more general openness to diversity in°uence the e®ect reforms may have on banks'
performance and stability.
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